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Abstract 
Vander  Veen  (1995)  has  argued  that  a  principal  has  an  incentive to monitor 
risk  averse agents engaging in team production.  We  show that this result rests 
on  specific informational assumptions that are not essential to team production. 
Moreover, under typical team environments and contract  conditions there is  no 
benefit  from monitoring of  individual agents, leaving only costs for  the princi- 
pal,  We identify an additional mechanism design problem that arises in  certain 
team settings-the  principal must  determine when  to make information  about 
each agent's reported ability public to the other team members. 
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applies. r.  Ieatns are clearly a1  eco~lo~~lically  in~portiult  orgarLizatio~w1  forln. h  fact: illchiau arid 
llelnsetz (1972) identify 'ttea~n  use of  inputs' to production as a defining property of' firiru. 
'l'be  typical mutivatio~~  for  teal  forn1~tio11  is the existence of  cornplen~entarities  or syner- 
gies i11  jx-ududiun bet\veen tear1 n~errlbe~s.  Although other authors have bee11 less precise: 
Alchiau ud  Demsetz (1972) dehe  team production as izlvolvir~g  at least- two inputs: where 
the productiou fullctiol~  is uot sq~arable  ill the iudi vidual i11puts.l In a siillilar vein; McAfee 
ud  McMillau (199  1) assume cornj~leruentuities  bettveeu individual agents' coutribu  tious. 
Ider~tifiuatiun  of  the collditiuus under. which a principal 11ds  to rnuuitur individual agents 
in a tear11 is one of  the rllajor themes of this liternture."'a~der  \reell (1993) has argued that 
agent risk aversion provides an explanation for such xnouitaring, 'l'he objective of this article 
is to show tbat this result does :sot derive principally from core properties of team production 
(as dehed above). Rather: it depends upon the requirement of  w interiu~;  rather tha~  ex 
post, individual rationality. 'I'he re111ainder of  the h~troduc-ion  is dedicated to a brief survey 
of the relevant literature in order to place the issue iu cuutext, 
Alhatl wid  1)er11setz (1972) coiljectued that if  teat11 nlenibers have objectives tbat are 
not  coincident  with  those of  the principal,  the11  a loss of  tern1 control will result if  the 
teat11 leader (errlployer) is unable to observe each teal  ~lleu~ber's  (ea~yloye's)  actions (or 
private ir~fornlatiou).  'I'he intuitiou is that tear11 rllelz~bem  will be te~upted  to free-ride if  the 
principal is  urlable  to observe their iudividual effort.  The idea that it is rrlore difficult  lo 
nlaktl observations on the effort of irldividud ageuts is i~~t  uitive. Citing Alchiarl and De~nxtz 
(1972): 
or  .  .  .  teat11 productiou: meabwiug marginal productivity ad  malcii~g  payments 
in accord therewith is more exj,ensive by iu~  order of  mag~litude  than for separable 
produc  tiosl fuctions. 
lln other  bvords: the productio~l  functiol~  f  (zl:  ax) satisdies that the c~w~s-putial  derivative f12 f 0. 
"1  dter~lative  perspective on teals  is  offered  by hlmchtlk ruld Kadrier  (19%). 
1 Alhim md  Dansetz (197'2)  suggest that  this problem explains why capitalist firms have 
a.11  adrutage over partnerships atld other cooperative organizatiollal forrns.  'I'he  owuer; or 
principal: is able to act as an exterual  ioni it or^ providiug agents \viih incentives to behave 
efficiently.  Since the principal is a residual claimant, ruosal huxd  relating to monituiug 
does not arise. 
However, several inlpostzult papers have shown that a lack of obser vability of  agent efforl 
does not exacerbate free-riding prubleras.  'This is because tear11 menlbers' effort irlcer~tives 
cau be perfectly and costlessly coutrolled using onl? inceatives based  on leu1  output-110 
individual nioaitoring. is required. The first such result is due to Groves (1973), although it 
is shown in a public goods setting-there  is ao individual rationality constraint-ad  there 
axe 110  conlplenla~t  wities betweeu teal  members. 
Holmstso111 (1982) showed that efficieut tear11 produc%ion  car1 be achieved by relying solely 
on iilcentives (based o~dy  011  team output) to eliminate free-riding  by  agents.  'I'hus,  the 
principal's osselltial role is not one of  n~oaitorirlg,  but rather to allow brealrirlg of  the budget- 
balmce cordition: since obtainhg efficiency  requires penalizing all agents in the event that 
the efficient  team output level is not  produced.  hi  important implication of  this resdt 
is that it  brealrs.  the intuitio~l  that  teiri production necessarily implies a loss of  co~ltxul. 
Kegardless of  the learn size and the nature of  tear11 production: agent effort cu  be perfectly 
coutrolled through appropriate desigu of  the co~nyensatiou  ru1e.V~  the case of  stochastic 
tea  produc%ioil: a nurnbes of  additioual assu~ptions  on  the liltelihoud ratio md ageill 
elidowllierlts are required to get this same result. 
McAfee and Mchfilliill(19  91) further stragthen this hdiug  b?  showir~g  that Holmslro~n's 
result also holds when lean  production is characterized by both r~loral  hazard arid advase 
selecqion problems. Specifically, they show that  the ability tu rrlor~itor  individunl co~~tribu- 
lions does not  affect the pri~icipal's  welfue.  The introduction of  adverse selection results 
%swaiu~  wd  Icutwal (1984) uute that the curr~pe~ation  rule used by  I.Iulrrwtrul11 suffas fiurr~  the yruble~ll 
that a irloral hazard rlow arises in relation to the piqincipd: who has an incentive to bribe agents to erbw'e 
that the efficieut output level is isvt produced, 
2 in the principal havi~q  to yay ageuts arl information rent:  but  the moral hazwd aspect of 
lhe problem is essentially ur~changed. 'I'he  opti~rlal  calnpensation rule is of  the fofonn  of  a 
two-put tariff. Agents lrlalce a lup  sum payment  LO  the griucipal pios to production ud 
the principal malies a vuiable payrneut (based on team output) to agents after production 
uccurs.  tach agent's lurrlp surrl ~)ayment  equals their expected vaiable pa_vnlent less their 
inforrnalion rent and effort cost, thus ensurirlg their participatiuu ud  i~lcwtive  co~llpatibili  ty 
co~lstrailrts  are satisfied.  In order tu ensure eEcitillt productio~~,  in the absence of  adverse 
selectiou eadi aged is paid 100 pacent of' the value of  any increase in teat11 nraghal out- 
put. Since ir~  rtu 72 11le1nber teanl this results in asregate  marginal rexvards equal to 71 tilrles 
the value of  teiun irlargil~al  output, the above offsetting lurnp surr~  payrrlw~ts  are required. 
lntruducing adverse selectiurl caw~s  the priucipal to distort efforl incwtives downward for 
all but  the 111ost efficient type, in order tu  econalnize on i~~for~llaliou  rt3l1ts payable.  Thus, 
these agents are paid less tha  100 perceut of  the value of  teaxu margiual out~mt,  Ouce 
again we  see illat the role of  the principal is essalially lu &low bredcillg of  the budget. No 
monitoring role is irrq.)lied. 
More recently, Vauder Lien (1995)  has used the model of  McAfee aud McMillasl (1991) 
(hereafter M11.l)  lo iugue that  agent riulc  aversio11 car1 explaiu wh:  prilldpals rlionitor in- 
dividuals in tearls?  h  order to uderstaud this result, recall that in MM the solution is 
illdependent of  whether corlipellsation is co~idilio~~ed  u11 illdividual or lea11  output. It follows 
that if each qent perceives theh indvidud contribution to output to be detwnliuistic while 
viewing telun output as stochastic, then conditior~i~lg  agent  conlpensation on  lea11 output 
sather tllau  ir~dividual  out~~ut  ~nalres  risk  avelxe agents stl-idly worue  off,  Alterr~aiively: 
igrlorilig rnouitoriug costs, it is cheaper for the principal to offer the required iuce~ltivesr  to 
agents when cumpensatio~l  is coz~ditiolled  011  i~ldividud  rather than team output, so the prin- 
cipal strictly prefers the forum. 'Ihus: provided monitoring is not too costly, the priucipal 
prefers to monitor qe~its  ad  compensate the111 according to their illdividual contribution. 
4hmthe~  exiunple uf  such a result,  based on cous%r;li~its  on feasible trwlders rather than rislc  aversion, is 
co~~tdned  in Ilyde, Kausser md  Sir~iun  ('LUUU). 
3 h  the nexl section we  discuss Vmder Ireen (1995):  bringing illto sharp focus  the as- 
su~~y)tions  uuderlyiug his result. h doiilg so:  we show  the ~.esult  depends on  aspects uf  the 
iufwmationd structue of  the pro blern  that are not intrinsic to team production. 
2.  A Cltlrrrqus or: XANDEIZ  VEEN  (1995) 
Several issues coincide to ndie the contributiozi of  Vw~der  Creen (1995) (hereafter VV) 
at fist uncleu.  The statement of' the principal's proble111 is confusing to the extent that 
expectations over ageuts' types are not tdcen in either the objec  live fution  or the individual 
rationality castraiut.  The for~ner  is of' little consequerlce since  the solution alaximixes 
the p~incij)al's  objective function yoi~ltwise. However:  as zve  show  below;  the  use  of  a 
ex post: rather  thm iuterin17  individual rationality constraiat is precisely what is required 
to invalidate the rnaia result.  Together with  the fad that Equation (7)  in MM, whch is 
the reference lrlodel for VV:  clearly implies au intwiu individual rationality constrai~lt~  it 
appears that the use of  an ex post constraiut in VV is a typographical mistake. 
Followir~g  fro111 above, there is potential for confusio~l  in identifiing the source of  the result. 
It is useful to  begin by noting that agents in Mh.1 face Iwo types of' uncertainty. First, they 
do uot  Iwow  the ability of  the other agents--this  is private illfor~lation.~  Secorld; they do 
not 1uow what  team output will  be realized ex post, eve11 if  they how aL1 agentsi types: 
siuce lea11  output is a stochastic fu~lction  of  lean inputs. 
In juinciple, removal of  either type of uncertainty could urrderpin VV's result. However; 
relrloval of the second type of' u~lcertainty  would be of  limited interest shce  this ucertainty 
is 1101  au esseutial element of' team produdiull.  'lb cite Holrrlstro111 (19132): 
"h  contrast to the singleagent case: mod  hazard problems rnay occur even wherl 
there is no uncertai~ty  ill output. 'I'he reasou is that agents who  cheat caullot be 
identified if joint  output is the only obswvable indicator of  inputs.'' 
5.illthvugJl agetits dw  canuot observe each otliax' effort: this dow ?got constitute a secoud, distiuct svwce 
of  uucertainty.  'I'he  reason i~ that agents can infer the principal%  dehd  tear1 output level fur any giveu 
profile of tern1 melribw abilities. 
4 1Cloreover: to assume tea11 output is stochastic but that individual contributious cu  be mea- 
sured pel-fectly see~ns  so~ilewhat  a.r bitrwy.  Int uilion suggests t hat irldividual co~ltri  butions 
ue  difficult to obverve ud  thus likely to be measured b~i~~rwisely.  This will  detract from 
the principal's preference for muuitoring, In any cave7  the follotving quote from I'V suggests 
that the r~sul  t rests ou the re~x~oval  of  the uncerlainCy s  le~rlixlillg  fro111 psi vate inforlslaliu~l: 
"Since effort ad  ability are wobservable, each individual agent car~~lot  be cestaiu 
what each of the agalts will coutribule, and thus, there is iul inherent u~lcel.taiuty 
for each of'the agents. Removing this uncertaifit_~  would increase the utility of'rislc 
avwse agwts. If' the prillcipal cau (pe1fwlly) mollitor i~ldividui  corltributions of' 
both &or1  arid abilit,v, the& this u~~cestainty  cw  be diminatexi.'' 
For  the reasur.1 discussed above aud in order to avoid confusio~l:  henceforth  we  iguore the 
uncertainty due to the stochastic nature of  team ~~soductiuu. 
Irl order tu explain the 1necharLlsrr1 underlying the vesult, it is necessary to clarify how  this 
ulicerlair~ty  ex~ters  agents' decision problem.  Each ageilt is assurrled to lu~o~v  their ow11 ability, 
but nut the ability of  the other agentsts;  at the time of  their puticipatiofi decision-that  is, au 
irzler-i~n  participiitio~~  coxmtraint is ixnposed.  Each aged"  s~certainty  about the abilities of' 
the otha  agerits causes the111 to also be uucertain about the individual contributio~ls  of  other. 
agents, since it is not know11 what cornpensatiou rule they will be offered. 'Thus. each agmt is 
ullcertain about the tea11 output that will be realized: inlplying ulcestai~lty  about their own 
compensation (siace it is a functivn of  tear11 output).  Morlitorizlg individual co~~tributions 
allows agd  compeusatior~  to be metered 011  a noa-stochastic  variable since agents fully 
control their illdivid ual  contri but ion.  Ce  teris paribus,  this elimination of  uc&ahty  iu 
welfare inlprovi~lg  for risk  averse %cuts.  'I'his  allo\m. the j~riucipal  to  uffer a giveu set of 
inceritives at lo~ve~  cost, thus providi~lg  the motivatiou for monitoring. 
The ceutral ubservatiou theu is that the reductiv~l  iu uucertaktty due tu l~lonitori~lg  s1e111s 
directly f'rol11 the assur~lptiou  that each ageul does not kuow the ability of 0th-  &salts  at the 
time of their participation decision. But is this assunlptiou. a11  irltriwic property of  tewrls:) Iu 
5 the sense that it is not part of the usual definition of  team productioa, the auswer is no.  Yet 
there are certai~lly  plausible tear11 situations whatin this assumption will hold. Specifically; 
il will hold if  agents have no  prior lu~owledge  of  each other arld labor corltracts culot be 
broken (or C'U  only be  broken at high cost). ln such cases, the participation decisiol~  must 
be ~r~adt:  before there is my  olrl~ortunity  for i~ifor~natior~  revelatio~i.  Arlother setting in which 
this assulrqllion {~ould  be appropriale is if; despite labus contracts not being enfosceable, 
agents du riot lea11 about the abilities of other tear11 ~rien~bas  before tan  output is finalized. 
However: such a scenario is suggestive of  weal; interactions between teal  members; iu tvlich 
case the pure tear11 aspect of  produdior~  may  be  of  second-order  irriportarrce lo the firm. 
'l'hus,  this scenuiu znay not  be  very instructive to our u~lderstandi~lg  of  wliy fir111s ~riorLitor 
ageuts in leans. This leaves situatious involving eufo~eable  a~iployxilent  coutracts as tlie 
primary basis upon which to ague  for use of  UI  interim individual ratio~~dity  constraint. 
We  contend, however: that labor contracts car1 ty~rically  be  broken (at low cost).  hdeed; 
casual observatioll suggests that ~~~ost  erri~~loyees  car1 resign with verj little cost by si111ply 
allowkg theiu em~doyer  the customary notice period (often one uiouth).  Assunling: that either 
agents' reposts to the principal are publicly observable or (hat asents are able to make direct 
ubservations on each olhers'  abilities before engaging in substantial effort: it follows that 
agents will be informed about other agents' abilities when making their participation decision. 
111  thesu: situations:  the result  of  VV does not  hold-there  is 110  bellefit  fromi  ~rionitoring 
because there is no uncest ain ty to be removed from agents' cumy  erisatio~~.  Monitoxing only 
i~itroduces  additional costs for the principal. 
To sunllnxize, the 11lai11 techlical point  we 111'alie here is as follows. 
Proposition 1.  If  Lhr  p~'Z1acipuI  is  rtljl~ind  Lo  sntisjjl EX pusl  i.rtd+uidztnZ rxslionaliky wrast~.a+izls 
for  Ltnnl  .~l~c*rnbtrs,  lheu  cuall~  ~ILOTLZ~~~I~  of  individual conls.ibuliuns '~t~(tktrs  Lht:  p~.i.r~cip(tZ 
striully worse 08. 
We  feel this pokt is worth xnding because ex post  individual ratioualily co~lstraints  see111 
more relevant to undersla~lding  real-\wrld leiu~is  than the i~iteriln  cuuuterpxrl.  'The yeasou 
is captured in the followiug coojecture. 
6 Conjecture 1. Agetab  curt  lgpicu1lg break rnq)loyrnrraL cor~t~ucls  ut 2i.tllc;  w. ?lo cost.  Alsu; 
leclrrt  i/~le~'acliu~2~  'will IypZcadly  IFSP~E~  in arb  ayerit's  (tbililllj  being quickdy  uevecdtd  lo  other 
Ltwt  71~entbtw. 
'l'llis  leads us  to draw the following condusiou. 
Corollary 1.  Pus*  Iht ciuw of ~MJI~S  ~hu.~-a~tt~iztdf  by lht ~).r~,~~~r-tits  231  C~wbjt~t'{crt  1: rr~o7ti- 
torirly izgents'  i7zdivid7~(zl  CU:U~~~-~~YL~~OTW:  ~uikl  iypiccdly deertat Ll~e  ,we&i~.t ujC  Ikt ~ui~i;llczp(~I. 
A natural conclusion to draw fro111 the discussiorl above is that my  role risk avasiou has iu 
explaining why  principals rsionitor agents is n~ore  lilcel?  tu worlr  lhmugh agents: perception 
thal measures of  team output iuvolve g~eattx  urlcertaiuty thal  measures of' individual out  y  ut. 
However: for reasolis already n~entiolled:  i11  so~nt:  salse tlis is a1  unsatisfactory basis ul~ou 
which to wgue for the knportauce of  risk ave~sion  as ax1 explanation for mo~itoriug  individ- 
uals ill temis.  \l\'hile  uncertainty over. measures of  iudividual contributious rnay plausibly 
be viewed  as an inherent property of  lear1l pruductiorr:  the assul~lptiuu  of' stochastic teatu 
output giveu deterluiuis9ic iuy uls dues not appear lo  be esbwltial to the concept of  team 
produclion.  Note that we  are not sayiillg that the latter is always m wealistic assumption, 
simply that it does llot appear to  be a nece~ssn~y  property uf  teams.  For. these reasons:  we 
believe that in Islarly (if not mob?)  learn situatiuus that risk aversion will tend to provide a 
disirtcentive for principals to mollitor. 
M't:  fmish  by llutiug that the discussioa here raises wl irlleresting design issue.  Suppose 
that the pri.rlcipal is able to determine whether age~~ts'  reports of  their ability will be publicly 
observable.  MTe  kcnow  that if  agents would uot uthmvise observe each others'  ability: then, 
usirsg  the logic of  VV7  there is a benefit to the priuciy~d  fro111 nlakcir~g  these reports public- 
it elimiuates a source of  mcertaiuty for ridc averse agents.  hloreovex: it seems lilcdy thal 
such public revelation will  be a ~lluch  less expensive way  fur the ~~rinciyal  to elinlinate this 
uncestai~lty  than eugagil~g  in individual ~llonitoring. Howeva:  uder swne ciscunmtauues 
(i.e., draws uf  agent types), the principal will 'have a strict iuceutive not  to reveal agents; 
7 ability reports because doing so will result  in violation of  the ex post  individual ntiorlal- 
ity calistr;tint fur some t ear11 n~embels'  (whose illterilrl individual tlratiollality cons traiut was 
satis&d). 
lruder wkat  couditiorls will a ~xirlcipal  c'hoose to publicly reveal age11ts'  abhties'!  PLY- 
su~nably  it is least likely to be  optimal when the draw of  types is higldy skewed in the sense 
of  haviag muy  low ability agents arid relatively few high ability agents. h  this case; it may 
be profitable for the latter to default ou  their employ~rmit  curltract following revelation of 
otlwrs' types. However7  if  the principal is unable to credibly colnlnit to a revelation strategy 
before typev axe reported, what then can agents infer about other learn nl~embers'  abilities 
when the principal does not reveal their reports?  It may be optimal for high ability agents 
to quit the tear11 myway: siuce the absence of  infor~uation  may lead than to cv~ldude  that 
the relrlai~li~lg  agents we of  low  ability.  Are there conditions uuder which it is optiulal fur 
the princil)al to cummit ex ante to a report  revdatiou strategy'?  What incentives we in 
pl-dce to ensure tha~  the prindpal's public retrmsmissiun of  the reports back to the agents is 
truthful? In particular: it would seem  that both the principal atld low ability agents could 
benefit fro111 some exagge~aatiorl  of  the ability of  the latter-both  benefit from persuading 
high ability agents to re~nain  on the team. 
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